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OLIVER P. FIELD
The withdrawal from service by a public utility is a problem
of comparatively recent origin. The greater part of the nine-
teenth century witnessed a rather unseemly scramble for entry
into the field of public service on the part of many individuals and
companies. The entry into the field of public service business
was for some years before and after the Civil War commonly
associated with the grant of certain favors by the local, state,
or national governments. The records of state legislatures con-
tain many sordid tales of the various means and influences which
were brought to bear upon the lawmakers, not without some
measure of success, to obtain these favors which were so gener-
ously handed out by the legislative authorities. What the legis-
latures had done, the courts insured against being undone by the
formulation,of the doctrine that a corporate charter was a con-
tract which could not be impaired by state action.
It was not long until state constitutions began to show the
effect of this rush for legislative favors, for with the revision
of the constitutions of many states during the middle period of
the century, provisions were inserted shackling the hands of the
legislative bodies in the matter of franchise grants. These pro-
visions were aimed particularly to prevent the future legislatures
from bestowing similar favors upon public service companies.
In those beginning days of modern public service in this country,
the only method of enforcing the peculiar obligations which were
said to rest upon these callings was by way of the courts. Some-
times citizens would seek to obtain court action to force the
utility owners to serve them; at other times they would sue for
damages in tort; and in still other instances they would sue in
contract. At times the legal representative of the local or state
government would attempt to enforce the duties which were
thought to be owing to the community by the utility owners. It
is not surprising, therefore, to find that these same methods were
utilized to prevent utilities from discontinuing their service and
withdrawing from the field of public callings. So we find some
of the early cases on discontinuance initiated by citizens seeking
in their private capacity to prevent the withdrawal., In others
1 See, for example, the bill filed by ten citizens in BrotuclI v. Old Colony
Railroad (1895) 164 Mass. 29, 41 N. E. 107. In the following cases single
individuals sought court aid, Savannah Canal Co. v. Shuman (1893) 91 Ga.
400, 17 S. E. 937; People ex rel. Van Dyke v. Colorado Cent. Ry. (1890, C.
C. D. Colo.) 42 Fed. 638.
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the action was instituted by legal representatives of the politically
organized group, 2 and, in the earliest case, by the legal repre-
sentative of the state, who was seeking to punish the utility
owners for their failure to continue service by subjecting them
to criminal prosecution3
The courts did not prove to be an altogether effective agency
for the supervision of the utilities; and great injustices and dis-
criminations seem to have been perpetrated in the matter of rates
and services. Competition would sometimes operate as a safe-
guard to the public, but at other times not only failed to act as a
buffer against the utility companies, but resulted in actual hard-
ship to the public. It was not long, therefore, before other means
of enforcing the duties fastened upon public utilities were de-
vised. As the result of considerable experimentation, the modern
public utility commission has come to be the agency chosen by
most of the states for regulating the utilities. To these regula-
tory commissions has been given also the power to control the
withdrawal of 'public utilities from service,4 although the instru-
mentality of the courts has not been wholly abandoned.5
Some doubts were expressed by the courts in the earlier cases
as to the power of the utility owners to discontinue service in
toto even if the service was a losing one. And it was, of course,
2 As illustrative, see People v. Albany & Vt. R. R. (1862) 24 N. Y. 261;
Attorney Gen. v. The West Wis. Ry. (1874) 36 Wis. 466,
3 Carter v. Commonwealth (1823) 2 Va. Cas. 354. The court held in this
case that the statute in question did not make it a crime to fail to operate
the ferry which was involved, but held that such failure to operate was
merely grounds for forfeiture of the charter.
4 See Va. Sts. 1923, sec. 3810, and Ohio Code, 1920, see. 504-3. Statutory
provisions giving the commission general control over facilities and opera-
tion are construed to include withdrawal and abandonment. People ex rol.
Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co. (1918) 65 Colo. 472, 178 Pac. 6;
Herpolsheimer Co. v. Lincoln Traction Co. (1914) 96 Neb. 154, 147 N. W.
206. The Interstate Commerce Commission has been given power to permit
the withdrawal of interstate carriers in see. 402, pars. 18-20 of the Trans-
portation Act of 1920.
G In Iowa, petitions for permission to withdraw must be filed with the
courts, and they pass upon these petitions. See Iowa Code, 1897, sec. 2092,
Also State ex rel. Brown v. Beaton (1920) 190 Iowa, 223, 178 N. W. 1;
State of Iowa v. Old Colony Trust Co. of Bosto (1914, C. C. A. 8th) 215
Fed. 307. The courts are still resorted to when commission findings ar6
assailed on questions of law. As a recent example of resort to the courts
by the state for immediate action see the case of MeCran v. Public Service
Ry. (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 22, 122 AtI. 205, where the owners of the utility
had discontinued service because of a strike. The court held that mandamus
would issue to compel the owners to operate the car lines, that the owners
would go 'bankrupt just as quickly by letting the plant lie idle as they
would by 'operating it, and that, if necessary, the court would appoint a
receiver to'operate the road. This case illustrates the lengths to which a
court can go, if it is so disposed, in aiding the public in compelling the
utility owners to fulfill the duties which rest upon them.
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in the case where the utility was not paying, that the owners
-wished to withdraw from the business. An early federal case
contains this dictum :G
"That a railroad cannot be abandoned after it has become one
of the thoroughfares of the country, and that the company will, by
proceedings in behalf of the state, be forced to continue the road
and perform all its duties to the public is beyond question."
A few years later a state court made a very forceful statement
to the same effect, answering the argument that the corporation
could abandon the utility enterprise against the will of the state
by saying,7
"The possible effects of such a claimed power are utter disaster
to the great interests of the state, certain destruction of private
property, in which whole communities, created and existing upon
the faith of the continuous use of the chartered powers, are inter-
ested, and, indeed, the life of the citizen, as well as his property
rights, are thus jeopardized. Upon principle it would seem plain
that railroad property, once devoted and essential to public use,
must remain pledged to that use, so as to carry to full completion
the purpose of its creation; and that this public right, existing"
by reason of the public exigency, demanded by the occasion, and
created by the exercise by a private person of the powers of the
state, is superior to the property rights of corporations, stock-
holders, and bondholders."
It will be noticed that these early dicta treat the question as
one involving a balancing of economic and social interests. Pri-
mary emphasis is placed upon the consequences of a proposed dis-
continuance of service. There is scarcely discernible any sug-
gestion that a duty to continue operation arose from any charter
contract.
Whatever may have been the doubts expressed in these earlier
cases, it seems that the modern rule is that a state may not com-
pel the owners of a utility to continue operation if the utility is
losing money on its entire service with no reasonable prospect of
earning in the near future a fair return on the money invested.
The same rule obtains if the source of supply upon which the
utility depends becomes exhausted.0 In either of the above cases
the owners may totally abandon the service, although they must
satisfy the proper governmental agency that they are within the
6 Talcott v. Pine Grove Township (1872, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 1 Flipp. 120,
145.
7 Gates v. Boston & N. Y. Air-Lime R. R. (1SS5) 53 Conn. 333, 343, 5 Atl.
695, 699. For a review of the early cases see Chaplin, Limitation upon the
Right of Withdrawal from Public Ernploymzt (1903) 16 HLnv. L. REv. 555.
8 Brooks-Scanon Co. v. Railroad Comm. of La. (1920) 251 U. S. 390, 40
Sup. Ct. 183; Bullock v. Railroad Comm. of Fla. (1920) 254 U. S. 513, 41
Sup. Ct. 536; Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R. (1923) 264
U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct 247. For note on earlier cases see L. R. A. 1915A 546.
9 Fellows v. Los Antgeles (1907) 151 Calif. 52, 90 Pac. 137; Village of
St. Clairsville v. Public Util. Comm. (1921) 102 Ohio St. 574, 132 N. E. 151.
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class of losing utilities to which this rule applies. For the state
to compel the owners of a utility to operate it after it has been-
shown that continued service can only be rendered at a loss is said
td deprive them of their property without "due process of law"
and to take from them their property without just compensation.0
The technique which the courts have used in these withdrawal
cases has been largely that of contract. It so happened that from
the nature of the business involved many of the owners of public
utilities were corporations, chartered by the state. From the
time of the Dartmouth College case" these corporate charters have
been regarded as contracts which might not be impaired by state
action. The result of this doctrine was that the privileges which
had been granted to public service companies by the legislatures
could not be snatched from the corporations by succeeding and
more virtuous ones. To phrase it in terms of the public utility
problem here under consideration, the doctrine that a charter
was a contract resulted in allowing the corporations to stay in the
public service field, unmolested by legislative intervention so far
as their franchise privileges were concerned. Subsequent de-
cisions, however, have badly mutilated the doctrine enunciated
in the Dartmouth College case.
12
The courts still pay homage, however, to the doctrine of the
charter contract; and it is from this source that we get the first
fundamental proposition in the process of reasoning which is
found in withdrawal cases. It is that the utility owner is bound
to operate the utility for the period of the charter if he is expressly
required to do so, despite the fact that he may be losing money
by the continued operation of the plant. 13  The next following
proposition is that the acceptance by a corporation of a charter for
a term of years does not obligate the grantee to construct the
plant, nor does the fact that the utility plant is constructed by
virtue of the authority giveni in the charter, and service rendered
to the public by such plant, obligate the owner to operate the
10 See cases cited supra, note 8. Additional cases involving total abandon-
ment enunciate and apply the same rule. Jack v. Williams (1902, C. C. D.
S. C.) 113 Fed. 823; N. Y. Trust Co. v. Portsmouth & Exeter Street Ry.
(1911, C. C. D. N. H.) 192 Fed. 728; Lyon & Hoag v. Railroad Comm.
(1920) 183 Calif. 145, 190 Pac. 795; Potter Matlock Trust Co. v. Warren
County (1919) 182 Ky. 840, 207 S. W. 709; State v. Duluth & N. M. Ry.
(1921) 150 Minn. 30, 184 N. W. 186; Railroad Comm. of Arlo. v. Salino
River Ry. (1915) 119 Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 897.
11 (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 518.
12 See 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (1910) 897 et seq.; 1 Warren,
The Supreme Court in United States History (1922) 492.
13 Bullock v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note 8; Potter Matlock Trust
Co. v. Warren County, supra note 10; State v. Duluth & N. M. Ry., supra
note 10.
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utility for the term specified in the charter.'4 The exercise of
eminent domain or other powers of government which was stressed
in the earlier cases does not now serve to fasten any obligation
to continue operating the utility upon the owners.'5 If the utility
fails to earn a fair return upon the investment the owner may dis-
continue service. Why? Because he was not expressly bound
by his contract to continue to operate the utility even if it lost
money. After reading a large number of cases and noticing that
the charters which come before the courts for construction in this
class of cases never seem to be mandatory, but always permissive,
one wonders whether there is in existence a charter at present.
which expressly binds the owners of the utility to operate it within
the rule laid down by the courts, particularly that expressed by
the United States Supreme Court. But suppose that such a
charter could be found. By a use of the technique of contract
the utility owner would still escape the duty of continuing to
operate the plant, because while it is true that property which is
utilized in rendering a public service is dedicated to a public use,
the consideration for such a dedication is that the public shall
use it sufficiently to enable the owner to operate his business as a
paying proposition. It is either regarded as a part of the con-
sideration, or a condition on which the dedication is made.' If
consideration and conditions present a closed door, the doctrine of
lack of mutuality is invoked. 7 If it be argued that the charter
14 Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R., spra note 8; People
v. Albany & W. Ry., supra note 2; San Antonio St. Ry. v. State of Texeg
(1897) 90 Tex. 520, 39 S. W. 926.
1 Bullock v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note 8; Railroad Comm. of
Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R., supra note 8. But see the opinion in Day v.
Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. (1914) 80 Wash. 161, 141 Pac. 347.
1.6 Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R., supra note 8. In
the following cases will be found reference to or discussions of the con-
tractual element under review: State of Texas -v. Eastern Texas R. R. (1922,
W. D. Tex.) 2S3 Fed. 584; Railroad Comm. of Ark. -e. Saline River Ry.,
supra note 10; Potter Matlock Tnst Co. v. Warren County, supra note 10;
State v. Enid 0. & V. Ry. (1917) 108 Tex. 239, 191 S. W. 560; Southcrn
Ry. v. Franklin & Pittsylvania R. R. (1899) 9G Va. 693, 32 S. E. 485. In
some cases state aid in money or land grants has been loohed upon as plac-
ing the grantee under a contractual obligation. See State v. Sioux City Ry.
(1878) 7 Neb. 357; Farmers Loan, & Tnst Co. v. Hcnning (1878, C. C. D.
Kan.) Fed. Cas. No. 4666. In People v. Colorado Cent. Ry. (1S90, C. C. D.
Colo.) 42 Fed. 638, the court said, "As a general rule, a railroad company
accepting a charter from the state, under and in pursuance of which it
builds its road, may be compelled to do so if it has received state aid, or
if its charter in terms imposes this obligation." The court declined to say
what the rule would be in the absence of state aid.
17 See East Ohio Co. v. Akron (1909) 81 Ohio St. 33, 90 N. E. 40. It is
something of this same notion which prompted the court to say in Bullock;
v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note 8, that the utility must be permitted
to abandon without state consent because if it were not it would never be
able to abandon service, because the state could not be made a party to
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is granted subject to an exercise of the police power, and that the
regulation of public utilities generally is an exercise of the police
power, the answer is immediately returned that the United States
Supreme Court will determine for itself what are the elements
of the charter contract and what particular exercises of the police
power is to be deemed reasonable. 18 Furthermore, if it be thought
that existing statutes impose a duty to operate a utility for a
charter term (although it is surprising how few statutes there are
that cannot be explained out of the contract) ,19 the retort is avail-
able that the charter is also issued subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment with its tests of reasonableness, and that these would
override any existing statutory provisions which would impose
a duty to operate the utility at a loss. 20  Some courts decide the
case by saying that a company cannot exercise the privileges of
its franchise and at the same time refuse to give service, but that
if it cease to render service the charter must be surrendered. 2
Of course that merely begs the question, for the question to be
settled is whether the charter can be surrendered and the duty
to continue operation thus be escaped. This type of argument
really applies with more propriety to the cases of partial abandon-
ment, and will be touched upon again in connection with cases
of partial discontinuance of service.
It must appear quite plainly that if the courts had wished to
hold the utility to continued operation in spite of financial loss
they might have done so by use of the technique which appears in
the withdrawal cases considered in the previous paragraph. What
a perfectly familiar line of argument it would have been to have
said that a charter is a contract, that the duties imposed by the
charter must be fulfilled, and that the police power of the state
a proceeding for permission to discontinue. This argument has apparently
met with the fate it deserved, for it has never been referred to in any other
opinion or argument which has come to the attention of the writer.
Is Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R., supra note 8.
19 In addition to the statutes involved in this case see the construction
put upon those involved, in Jack v. Williams, supra note 10; Central Bank
& Trust Corp. v. Cleveland (1918, C. C. A. 4th) 252 Fed. 530; State of
Iowa v. Old Colony Trust Co. of Boston, supra, note 5.
20 State of Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry., supra note 16.
21Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm. of La., supra note 8; Fort
Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland (1925) 267 U. S. 330, 45 Sup. Ct.
249; and see particularly the remarks in Pittsburgh & Shawmut Coal Co.
v. Delaware & N. R. R. (1-923, N. D. N. Y.) 289 Fed. 133. See also
Savannah Canal Co. v. Shuman, supra note 1; State ex rel. City of Bridge-
ton v. The Bridgeton & Millville Traction Co. (1899) 62 N. J. L. 892, 43
Ati. 715; City of Helena v. Helena Light & Ry. Co. (1922) 63 Mont. 108,
207 Pac. 337. The California court seems to have held that if a man
voluntarily abandons the property he has in a utility plant, leaving it to
the public, he thus automatically divests the commission of jurisdiction to
compel him to continue operating the plant. See Lyon & Hoag v. Railroad
Comm. of Calif., supra note 10.
174 •
PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES
extended to the general power of regulating public utilities and
specifically to the regulation of service and the discontinuance
thereof; and further, that such limitations on the right to with-
draw as the state might see fit to impose were reasonable, and
therefore constituted "due process of law". It is submitted that
the time has come to abandon the technique of contract in settling
public utility questions, at least this sort of public utility question.
These charters are not contracts in the private law sense of that
term; and the law of contracts generally does not serve any use-
ful purpose in arriving at a proper decision of the question
whether the utility should be permitted to discontinue or not.
The charter contract theory only takes care of those cases where
the utility is owned by a corporation; and it was only due to the
fact that so many of the utilities were and are owned by corpora-
tions that the courts were led into this technique. It happens to
be true that the cases which are appealed to the courts of last
resort were usually appealed by corporations. Individual utility
owners doubtless were often deterred by the costs involved in
time and money from carrying their cases to the courts after com-
missions have made their findings. There are a number of in-
stances of utilities owned by private individuals. Many of these
owners have never received charters nor even franchise grants.
But it is not unknown to the law of public utilities to impose upon
these owners the burdens and duties of a public calling even
though they did not intend to enter that business or know that
they were doing so. Perhaps they would never have started the
business in many instances if they had known the legal situation
in which they were placing themselves. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the rule on total abandonment is the same whether the
owner be a private individual without any charter, or a corpora-
tion with either a "permissive" or "mandatory" charter. The
reason of the rule and the decisions of the courts seem to warrant
the statement that in either of these three instances the decision
will be the same, if the owners are able to demonstrate that they
are within the class permitted to abandon service entirely becaus2
they are losing money on the particular service involved.
What is really involved in these cases of total abandonment is
a conflict of economic and social interests. The economic inter-
ests of the investor are balanced against those of the consumer, -
and the same is true of the attendant social interests. The courts
favor the interests of the community in abandonment cases so
long as the utility earns a fair return; but when the utility fails
to earn a fair return the interests of the owner outweigh those
22 The court in a lower federal case said that the controversy in a with-
drawal case was really between the stockholders and bondholders on one
side and the people seeking to compel the utility to operate on the other.
Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. Cleveland, supra note 19.
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of the community in the mind of the court. In most of the cases
thus far decided involving questions of total abandonment, how-
ever, imminent bankruptcy seemed necessary before the codrts
were willing to shift the scales in favor of the investor. Why
should not these factors appear in the opinions rendered by the
courts, instead of obscuring the real issues by resorting to the
technique of contract? 23 'The charter contract doctrine which,
when formulated, allowed public service corporations to retain
their franchise privileges, is now being used to free them from
the burdens sought to be fastened upon them.
The cases thus far considered have involved the total abandon-
ment ogi service; but it often happens that a utility wishes to dis-
continue service on only one portion of its system, because that
particular branch is losing money. The rule governing in this
type of situation seems to be that loss on a branch, spur, street, or
portion of the system will not be sufficient ground for allowing a
discontinuance of service on the losing branch.24  But if the whole
system is so affected by this one branch that the loss on the branch
will cause the whole system to lose, it seems that the branch
service may be discontinued.2i The courts use the technique of
contract in many of these cases also; and some of the cases cited
23 Some writers think that the theory of contract as applied to public
utilities generally is giving way to the relational theory which seems to
have prevailed at common law. See Albertsworth, From Contract to Status
(1923) 8 A. B. A. JouR. 17; Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921)
29.
24 Western & Atl. R. R. v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm. (1925) 267 U. S.
493, 45 Sup. Ct. 409, Pittsburgh & Shawmut Coal Co. v. Delaware & N. R.
R., supra note 21; Southern Ry. v. Hatchetb (1917) 174 Ky. 463, 192
S. W. 694 (the language of the opinion is unnecessarily broad, but all
that is actually decided is the question of partial abandonment) ; Brownell
v. Old Colony R. R., supra note 1; Colorado & So. By. v. State R. R. Comm.
of Colo. (1912) 54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 606; cf. Northern Illinois L. &
T. Co. v. Commerce Cdmm. (1922) 302 Ill. 11, 134 N. E. 142. Also Ro
Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1922 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Wis.) 556; Re Valley
Railways (1923 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Pa.) 193. The case of Re Newport
News & Hampton Ry. Gas & Ele. Co. (1925 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Va.)
480, seems to be out of line with the decisions cited above. The Virginia
commission found in this case that the service furnished by the utility
was not earning a fair profit, but nevertheless decreed that because of
the inconvenience involved in" discontinuing service on certain of the streets
served, some of the car service should be maintained. The other services,
gas and electricity, were apparently paying services. It was not entirely
clear whether the accounts had been kept so as to be possible to tell for
a certainty what the earnings of each service were; but from the report of
the case it seems that the car service was losing.25State of Iowa v. Old Colony Trust Co. supra note 5. In this case a
short branch of an electric railroad on which a steam service was operated
was allowed to discontinue because the demand for service was not great,
the system as a whole shaky financially, and the roadbed in such shape
that to continue operation without considerable repair would be dangerous.
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under the heading of total abandonment in this connection will
be found to involve partial abandonment. In these cases the
community interest in service on the branch is balanced against
the interests of the owners and also those of the other communities
who are served by the system as a whole. Here also, as in the
cases involving total abandonment, the courts seem to require that
there be a real danger of financial ruin by continued branch opera-
tion before they will allow the branch to be abandoned. The
recent case of Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. BourlandI does
not decide anything contrary to the rules formulated above,
although the opinion is not entirely clear. In that case a street
railway was trying to escape its franchise duty to pave by aban-
doning service on the particular street required to be paved. The
court decided that the obligation to pave could not be thus avoided,
even though it appeared that the company could not afford th2
outlay of money which would be required by the paving project.
The actual decision went no further. The company was earn-
ing only 1.7% on the estimated value of its property; and when
the court said that the company could not be forced to continue
service if it should surrender its franchise it was doubtless this
fact which was in the back of the court's mind. There was a
case made out here which would have justified a total discontinu-
ance of service under the rule stated in connection with the cases
involving such discontinuance.
The court makes the statement that branch operation may be
compelled ". . even where the system as a whole fails to earn
a fair return upon the value of the property." This suggestion
is contrary to a decision of one of the lower federal courts,2- and
is believed to be contrary to sound policy. It should be the aim of
the court to compel the utility to serve as long as that can be done
without loss on the whole system, for in that way the entire com-
munity will be insured continued service; but when the continu-
ance of the branch at a loss so drains on the whole system as to
compel it to cease operation completely, thus resulting in depriv-
ing the entire community of service, it seems that discontinuance
of the branch should be allowed. The continued operation of as
much of the system as can profitably be operated would seem to be
a proper goal so long as loss on the whole system means that none
of the system need be operated. The court perhaps does not
mean exactly what it says, for under the prior decisions of the
26 Supra note 21. See also Milwaukec Elec. Ry. Co. -v. Milwaudhce (1920)
252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 306, in which case the road vas earning lez'
than six percent but the road was required to pave according to the fran-
chise ternms. The court said in the course of its opinion, "The financial
condition of a public service corporation is a fact properly to be considerm1
when determining the reasonableness of an order directing an unremunera-
tive extensiQn of facilities or forbidding their abandonment."
27 Supra note 25.
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court the utility could have abandoned service entirely, as previ-
ously indicated. If the policy of keeping up the service to the
community as long as possible is the desirable one, it seems clear
that a losing branch the continuance of which will result in a
deficit for the entire system, should be discontinued.
A rate which affords a fair profit for the whole of a street car
system is not to be considered as confiscatory, even though some
of its lines are losing money.28  In illustration of what is meant
by the term "system" an interesting Massachusetts case affords
an excellent example. In that case a railroad company had taken
over the operation of a ferry service and had operated it for
some time. It then abandoned this service because it could not
be made to pay; but the railroad company was forced to re-open
the ferry service on the ground that it had become a part of the
system and could not be discontinued as long as the system as a
whole was profitable. 8 In New York City some thirty ferries
were at one time operated by virtue of one franchise; and it was
held that where five of these ferries were losing money they must
nevertheless be operated, because the thirty considered together
were making money for the city.30 Where one railroad leases a
short line service as a branch, the lessee will not be allowed to
discontinue service upon that branch although it is losing money
in its operation; and specific performance will lie to compel opera-
tion for the term of the lease.31 But where the pleadings show
that the lease of the road in question was contrary to state law
the court will not compel the operation of the leased road."
If the state consents to discontinuance of service on a particular
branch, even though the system be a paying business, the service
on that branch may, of course, be abandoned.3 3  Some cases as-
28 Puget Sound Traction, Light and Power Co. v. Reynolds (1916) 244
U. S. 574, 37 Sup. Ct. 705.
29 Brownell v. Old Colony R. R., supra note 1.
30 Matter of Wheeler (1909, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 62 Misc. 37, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 605. The court decreed that the ferry line in question should be
put up at auction, this apparently being the extent of the city's duty under
later legislation. This case is distinguishable from that of Re Blooming-
ton & Normal R. & Light Co. (1922 E) Pub. Util. Rep. (Ill.) 770, in that
in the latter case the utility was furnishing two types of service, steam and
hot-water heat; but when the commission allowed the discontinuance of one
of the services the customers still had an adequate heating service left.
In the case of the ferries, however, it was apparently shown to the court
that many people would be without any adequate transportation service if
the ferries were discontinued.
31 Southern Ry. -v. Franklin & Pittsylvania R. R., supra note 16.
32 People v. Colorado Cent. Ry., supra note 1.
33 See, however, Pittsburgh & Shawmut Coal Co. v. Delaware & N.
R. R., supra note 21, where the court refused to allow a receiver of a road
to discontinue a losing branch without the consent of the state, this being
the rule of the state decisions. See also Southern Ry. v. Haphett, supra
note 24; New York Trust Co. v. Buffalo & Lake Erie Traction Co. (1920,
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sert that the charter of a corporation which has discontinued
service on a losing branch without state consent is subject to
forfeiture upon the bringing of a proper action31
There is some diversity of opinion on the question whether the
utility should be compelled to re-arrange its routings with a
view to making up the deficit on a particular line, by diverting
traffic from other profitable lines over the losing line. It ap-
peared in one case that the deficit could be made up by such a
re-routing of the traffic, but the commission refused to consider
this phase of the case and granted a petition for discontinuance
on the losing line.33 In another case) however, it was said that
the company was bound to abandon every losing line in order to
preserve the main lines, and that the utility would be held to
every economy before it would be permitted to discontinue ser-
vice. 3
6
It is to be remembered that it is a service which is to be
abandoned, and that it makes no difference so far as the rules
regarding discontinuance and dismantling are concerned, whether
the owner be an individual, a corporation, or a municipality."
The person or corporation may not be the one which founded the
business in a given instance and may have purchased the physical
Sup. Ct.)112 Alisc. 414, 183 N. Y. Supp. 278; City of Helciza v. Hclenca
Light & Ry. Co., svpra note 21.
31 See People v. Albany & Vt. By., supra note 2; Stata cx rel. City of
Bridgeton v. Bridgeton & Millville Traction Co., aupra, note 21; Railroad
Comm. of Ark. v. Saline River Ry., svpra note 10; San Antonio St. Ry.
v. State of Texas, supra note 14. In this case the court did not appear
to make any distinction between total and partial abandonment of service,
but held that mandamus would not issue to compel service on a certain
street, because the franchise was construed to be only permissive and not
mandatory. This case is to be closely confined to its facts, and really
decides nothing more than that the charter is not mandatory. In Attorney
Gen. -v. The West Ws. Ry., szpra, note 2, the court declared that action
would lie to forfeit the charter for having changed the terminals specified
in the charter granted the owners of the road. State -. Sioux City By.,
supra note 16, is a case of restricted authority. Action was brought to
quiet title to land donated by the state to the road; and the action had
been brought by the state before the period for fulfilling the conditions
of the grant had expired. The company was solvent, however, and the
court did intinate that mandamus would issue in a proper action to compel
operation according to charter terms.
35Re Beaver Valley Traction Co. (1924 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Pa.) 444.
30 Re Boston and Maine By. (1925 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (N. H.) 133. See
also in this connection Re Oronogo Gas Co. (1924 C) Pub. Util. Rep. (Mo.)
373. This" case involved a question of total abandonment; and the Mi zouri
commission held that if the loss was attributable to faulty management
by the company, a petition to discontinue would be disallowed.
37For a case involving a municipality see Fellows v. Los Angclcq, supra
note 9.
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plant at a judicial sale,38 or may even be a lessee of the utility."0
In all events he or it is subjected to the same duties as were im-
posed upon the original owner, at least as far as withdrawal is
concerned, it being assumed that the succession to the plant has
been by methods recognized by the law in this class of cases.
The cases involving total abandonment of service may include
utilities rendering a single service, or one rendering several dis-
tinct and separate services, such as heat, light, transportation.
and telephone service. No distinction has been drawn in most
of the commission cases between the abandonment of a single
service utility or the abandonment of one entire service of several
being rendered. 0 To illustrate, where a company was rendering
gas, electric, and steam-heat service and wished to abandon the
steam-heat service because that service was losing money, the com-
pany was permitted to discontinue the service under the same rule
which governs total abandonment of a single service utility.
4'
If a telephone company has voluntarily entered the express busi-
ness and wishes to discontinue the express business because it is
not desirable to continue it, although the express business is a
profitable one, still the telephone company must continue to oper-
ate that business in connection with the telephone business.
42 But
38 State v. Beaton, supra note 5, is an example of a judicial sale pur-
chaser. See also Re Kaneville Grain and Supply Co. (1923 E) Pub. Util.
Rep. (Ill.) 167; Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. Va. Table Co. v. Knight
(1923 E) Pub. Util. Rep. (Va.) 816; Cripple Creek Motor & Commercial
Club v. Colorado Springs & Cripple Creek Dist. Ry. (1924 A) Pub. Util.
Rep. (Colo.) 392. See for the effect of a state statute requiring purchasers
at judicial sale to operate the road, Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern
Texas Ry., supra note 8; State v. Dodge City & Trinidad Ry. (1894) 53
Kan. 377, 36 Pac. 747; City of Potwin Place v. Topeka Ry. (1893) 51 Kan.
609, 33 Pac. 309. Receivers appointed by federal courts are also subject
to the same duties as owners in abandonment matters. Pittsburgh &
Shawmut Coal Co. v. Delaware & N. R. Co., supra note 21.
39 Southern Ry. v. Franklin & Pittsylvania R. R., supra note 16.
40Be St. Croix Gaslight Co. (1919 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Me.) 487; Re
Winona Electric Light & Water Co. (1920 F) Pub. Util. Rep. (Ind.) 968;
Board of Trustees of Waterville v. Waterville Gas & Elect. Co. (1917 F)
Pub. Util. Rep. (N. Y.) 126. In the case of In Re Newport News & Hamp-
ton Ry. Gas & Elec. Co. (1925 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (Va.) 480, the Virginia
commission seems to have acted contrary to the view stated above. In
that case the car lines were losing, and the other services were paying;
but the discontinuance of service was allowed only on some of the car lines.
In City of Spartanburg v. South Carolina Gas & Light Co. (1924, S. C.)
125 S. E. 295, the court refused to allow the discontinuance of car service
although that service was losing money, because the franchise was con-
strued to bind the company to operate the gas and light services with the
third service. It was held that all must be operated or none, but turning
as it does on the construction of the franchise, the case is not in conflict
with the rule stated above.
41 Board of Trustees of Waterville v. Waterville Gas & Else. Co., supra
note 40.
42In Re Butters' Express (1921 B) Pub. Util. Rep. (Mass.) 452.
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if one of two services is losing while the other service pays very
well, the losing service will be permitted to discontinue." This is
the more true where the two services are of similar natures, such
as, for example, two types of heating service, it appearing that the
public can be taken care of adequately by the remaining heath..:-
service. 4 It should be added that these commission cases have
the support of at least a strong judicial dictum, if not an actual
decision. 5 This raises a problem in accounting also, for it some-
times happens that some of the same physical plant is used for
the several separate services, and it is not always easy to tell what
the allocation of costs of services should be." Commissions are
perhaps in a better position than the courts to work out such a
body of rules as may prove to be necessary to take care of these
situations. The treatment of each service separately, standing on
its own feet, would seem to be proper; for the people using gas
but not heat should not be made to bear a share of a losing heat-
ing service deficit. To continue operating the losing service may
burden the other services to the extent of making it necessary
to abandon them all. It would seem that the aim in all these cases
should be to preserve as much of the service to the public as is
possible. When this test is applied to the rule formulated by the
commissions in the above cases the decisions seem sound.
There are numerous illustrations of public utility service ren-
dered by individuals or corporations engaged primarily in a non-
utility business. These are to be treated the same as though their
only business was that of a public utility; and if the utility service
is losing, the other types of business in which the company may be
engaged can not be made to bear the burden of the losing service 7
43 Re St. Croix Gaslight Co., supra note 40.
- Re Bloomington & Normal R. & Lt. Co. (1922 E) Pub. Util. Rep. (Ill.)
770. See People v. Rome W. & 0. Ry. (1886) 103 N. Y. 95, 8 N. E. 369,
where one road consolidated with another, both roads having the came
terminals, and mandamus to compel operation of the one line which had
been discontinued was denied. In Day -v. Tacoma Ry., supra note 15, one
street car line had been rendered profitless by the building of a parellel
line; and the owner was allowed to discontinue the losing line because the
abandonment was said not to work "a prejudice to the public interest."
There being adequate service still remaining, the case was said not to be
within the general rule referred to above, the court saying that it would
not lend its aid to compel competitive service.
45 Northerz Illi2wis L. & T. Co. 'v. Commerce Comm., supra note 24.
46 On this problem see Re Alton Gas & Elcetric Co. (1917 F) Pub. Util.
Rep. (Ill.) 12.
47 For illustrations of lumber or logging companies establishing railroads
see Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm. of La., supra note 8; Bullock
v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note 8; Railroad Comm. v. Saline Rirc"
Ry., supra, note 10. Montell v. Consolidation Coal Co. (1876) 45 Md. 16,
was a case of a road built by a coal company; but since the holding out
had perhaps not been general, the road was allowed to be withdrawn. The
following cases involved furnishing of lighting service, Re Red River Mfg.
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One of the most important of the problems raised by recent
withdrawal cases is that of the substitution of service. Due to
the growth of auto bus competition with street car and other sub-
urban lines, this question of substitution of service has become
very acute in some localities."8 It may well be that the only
method whereby the street car company can escape financial
ruin because of these competing transportation services is that of
establishing a bus service itself. There would seem to be no
reason from the point of view of the public why this should not be
allowed in such a case. But in a South Carolina case where the
question was squarely raised, the charter of the company was
construed to obligate it to furnish car service and car service
only; and the court insisted that the charter was a contract, the
terms of which must be fulfilled.4 As a result a commission
order allowing the substitution of the bus service was set aside.
This would seem to illustrate from another angle the objection to
using the technique of contract in public utility cases. The
courts have held, quite correctly it is believed, that they will not
aid in compelling competing services to be furnished the public
when it appears that the public is being adequately served by
the remaining utility5 0
Thus far we have been examining the situations in which the
right exists to withdraw from service totally or partially. The
state may not compel the utility to operate in certain cases, but it
may take precautionary measures to make certain that the utility
in any given case is within the class entitled to withdraw. The
commission may therefore require the filing of a petition for leave
to discontinue; and to require such a petition and continued opera-
tion while action thereon is pending does not conflict with the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." A utility may
not discontinue service arbitrarily merely because it is being un-
fairly, or even illegally, treated by a municipality, but must seek
Co. (1924 D) Pub. Util. Rep. (Wis.) 385 (lumber co.); Re Gilmanton
Roller Mills Co. (1921 B) Pub. Util. Rep. (Miss.) 815 (roller mills); Re
Va'n Auken Pub. Utilities Plant (1925 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (N. H.) 460
(gdrage); Dunwell v. Fried Co. (1924 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (N. D.) 507
(hardware).
48 See the discussion in Re Valley Railways, supra note 24.
49 City of Spartanburg v. South Carolina Gas and Light Co., supra note
40; see also supra note 40.
59 See cases supra note 44.
51 Western & Atl. R. R. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., supra note 24;
State ex rel. Caster v. Kansaa Postal Tel.-Cable Co. (1915) 96 Kan. 298.
150 Pac. 544; State v. Missouri Southern Ry. (1919) 279 Mo. 455, 214
S. W. 381; Herpolsheimer Co. v. Lincoln Traction Co., supra note 4; People
ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co., supra note 4. See aIso
People's National Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (1924) 279 Pa. 252, 123
AtI. 799. Also the list of cases in Dunwell v. Fried Co., supra note 47, at
514.
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redress for wrongs done it through the legal channels afforded;
and while such relief is being sought service must continue to be
furnished.r2 But a grant of power to a commission to refuse per-
mission for discontinuance if the commission finds that such
withdrawal would prejudice the public interest is perhaps uncon-
stitutional.5 A utility which is unable to continue operation be-
cause of inability to renew an essential contract, partly as a result
of a previous judicial decision, cannot be compelled by a commis-
sion to carry on operations.2 The commission may find that the
utility should not be permitted to withdraw; and in such a case
resort may be had to the courts on the questions of law which
may be involved. On the other hand, the commission may grant
permission to withdraw even though the city served by the utility
is a party to the alleged contract. s
A state commission may be authorized to supervise receivers of
public utilities;5O and the receivers appointed by federal courts
are apparently in the same position as receivers appointed by state
courts so far as withdrawal matters are concerned.57 Purchasers
at a judicial sale held under authority of a federal court should
also be in a similar position; and one commission has so decided.-5
The Interstate Commerce Commission has been empowered to per-
mit withdrawal from service by interstate carriers; but this does
not extend to intrastate utilities.ro
52 City of Gainsville v. Gainsville Gas and Elee. Co. (1013) 65 Fla. 404,
62 So. 919.
O' State v. Duluth & N. Z1. Ry., supra note 10; see also (1921) G DII;'.
L. REV. 81.
54 State v. Western& Union TeL Co. (1922) 203 Ala. 228, 94 So. 466. In
this case the contract which the telegraph company had to place its poles
on the right of way of a railroad had expired, and the court held that this
amounted to an involuntary abandonment.
5 City of Spartanburg v. South Carolhma Gas azd Light Co., a:pra note
40. It was held in this case that the city could not tie the hands of the
state in its exercise of the police power under the Missouri constitution.
Ze People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co., szpra note 4.
5 See Pittsburgh & Shawmut Coal Co. v. Delaware & N. R. R., apra note
21, referring to section 65 of the Judicial Code.
- Cripple Creek Motor & Commercial Clzb v. Colorado Springo & Cripple
Creek Ry., supra, note 38.
- State of Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry. (1922) 258 U. S. 204, 42 Sup. Ct.
281, construing sec. 402, pars. 18-20 of the Transportation Act of 1920.
The court said that if the paragraphs here considered extended to intra-
state commerce they would be unconstitutional, but construed them to refer
only to interstate commerce. The court has said that a mere relocation
of the main track of an interstate carrier, not involving an abandonment
of main tracks or substantial change of destination does not fall within
the paragraphs referred to above. Railway Comm. of Calif. v. Southcr,
Pac. Co., (1924) 264 U. S. 331, 44 Sup. Ct. 376 (holding that a state could
not compel interstate carriers to build a new union station where a number
of existing stations would thereby have to be abandoned, and the lines lead-
ing to the station changed). The sections of the Transportation Act re-
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The rule seems well established by recent adjudications of the
United States Supreme Court that a public utility which is losing
money may under certain circumstances not only discontinue serv-
ice but may also dismantle its physical plant and sell the same as
salvage if it wishes to do so.10 There were previous cases in the
lower federal courts and in some of the state courts which had
indicated that this would be the rule; and attempts by public
authorities to enjoin the owners of the utility from removing their
physical equipment had failed in several instances.'
But a utility is not allowed either to discontinue service or to
junk its plant whenever and however it sees fit. With the advent
of commission regulation this phase of withdrawal cases received
attention. Commissions have been given jurisdiction over the
dismantling of plants in some states, and a petition is required to
dismantle, as it is to discontinue service.!2  In the days prior to
commission regulation the public was dependent upon the alert-
ness of the legal representative of the state or local governmental
ferred to do not apply to spur tracks. See sec. 22, and Western & Ati.
R. R. v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm., supra note 24.
0o Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R., supra note 8. The
court stated in this case that the denial of the right to salvage value is
contrary to the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
opinion explicitly asserts that the withdrawing utility may "get what it
can out of the property by dismantling the road." The earlier cases of
Bullock v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note 8, and Brooks-Scanlon Co.
v. Railroad Comm. of La., supra note 8, did not expressly decide this point,
although on the facts of those cases they might have been interpreted to
extend this far.
G1Jack v. Williams, supra note 10, aff'd (1906, C. C. A. 4th) 145 Fed.
281. Also Laighton v. Carthage (1909, C. C. D. Mo.) 175 Fed. 145, where
a water company was allowed to go into streets to pull up mains and
hydrants. The court said in the course of its opinion, "The right of com-
plainant at the termination of the contract to enter upon the streets of
the city to remove its plant, without let or hindrance, does not admit of
debate." See New York Trust Co. v. Portsmouth & Exeter Street Ry.,
supra note 10; Gilchrist v. Waycross St. & Suburban Ry. (1917, S. D. Ga.)
246 Fed. 952; State of Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry., supra note 16; Potter
Matlock Trust Co. v. Warren Co., supra note 10; East Ohio Gas Co. v.
Akron, supra, note 17; Enid 0. & W. Ry. v. State (1915, Tex. Civ. App.)
181 S. W. 498, rev'd in (1917) 108 Tex. 239, 191 S. W. 560. In Railroad
Comm. v. Saline River Ry., supra note 10, the court said that the fact that
discontinuance of service was permitted did not necessarily mean that the
utility might tear up the tracks. See NOTES (1919) 32 HAnv. L. REV. 716,
and COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75, wherein the writers in-
cline to favor* restricting the privilege to dismantle.
62 People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co., supra note 4;
Cripple Creek Motor & Commercial Club v. Colorado Springs & Cripplo
Creek Dist. Ry., supra note 38; Re Kaneville Grain & Supply Co., supra
note 38. The reasoning of Western & Atl. R. R. v. Georgia Public Service
Comm., supra note 24, sustaining a commission rule requiring a petition to
the commission before service be discontinued, would doubtless apply to a
similar rule regarding dismantling the plant.
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unit; and the remedies of injunction and mandamus were resorted
to,63 although specific performance was not considered a proper
mode of relief.04 If the utility had actually dismantled a portion
of the plant the courts did not usually compel the utility to restore
the plant and resume operation.- It seems, however, that the
English courts have done this,G and that one or two American
courts have also applied a similar doctrine.6c
The courts and commissions have evolved several administra-
tive rules which are usually designed to make certain that the
utility which is to withdraw from service and sell or dismantle
its plant shall do so in a manner that will work the least hardship
upon the public.
The courts have sometimes ordered receivers of bankrupt utili-
ties to operate the utility for a test period if there is any doubt
about the ability of the utility to earn a return sufficient to war-
rant keeping it in the public service.cs And receiver's certificates
may be issued in the discretion of the court during such a test
period, though the court is likely to be inclined to exercise this
power rather cautiously.60 If such a test period proves conclu-
sively that the utility is a losing venture beyond any reasonable
hope of restoration, the court will often entertain some sort of
proposal whereby the community affected may post a guarantee
to take care of the deficit which is likely to be incurred by a con-
63 People v. Albany & Vt. R. R., supra note 2; Attorncy Gcn. v. Tie
West Wis. Ry., supra note 1. See also Brow zc r. Old Colony R. R., cupra
note 1.
64 People v. Albany & Vt. R. R., supra note 2.
6 Jack v. Williams, supra note 10; Lyou and Hoag r. Railroad Com. of
Calif., supra note 10; People v. Albany & Vt. R. R., supra note 61.
rG Rex v. Severn & W. R. R. Co. (1819, K. B.) 2 Barn. & Ald. 61I.
67 Brownell v. Old Colony R. R., supra note 1, where a ferry was aban-
doned for twenty years, but ordered to be re-opened. See Atterucy Gen. v.
The West Wis. Ry., supra note 1. And in Saran zah Canal Co. v. Sl:zman,
supra, note 1, the court ordered service to be given, but said that it would
consider the fact that the company could not raise funds (if such vera
shown to be the case) as tempering its judgment in any contempt proceed-
ing which might follow the decree.
s This had apparently been the case in the earlier stages of the pro-
ceedings in Bullock v. Railroad Comm. of Fla., supra note S. See also the
statement of facts in Enid 0. & W. Ry. v. State, supra note 61; Newr Yorl.
Trust Co. v. Buffalo & Lake Eric Traction Co., szpra note 33. In Pittc-
burgh & Shauniut Coal Co. v. Delaware & N. R. R., supra note 21, the
receiver had operated the road two years and was making the venture
pay. He was not allowed to discontinue a losing branch which he h-
petitioned the court for leave to abandon. In Pottcr Matlockl Ttup.t Co. V.
Warren County, supra note 10, if the road could not be sold as a going
concern a receiver was to run it for one year before selling it as scrap.
c9 Central Bank and Trust Corp. v. Cleveland, -upra note 19; Gilkirlt
v. Waycross St. & Suburban Ry. (1917, S. D. Ga.) 246 Fed. 952; Gasser
v. Garde, Bay Ry. (1919) 205 Mich. 5, 171 N. W. 791.
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tinued operation of the plant.70 Of course such guarantees must
be substantial, and of such a nature that the owners of the utility
will not have their interests jeopardized by the arrangement.L
Commissions will usually try the expedient of higher rates
before they will permit the owners to discontinue service. But if
the rates have reached the point where the traffic falls off because
of them, and the utility is continuing to lose money, the commis-
sion will decree a sale or dismantlement of the plant.72  This
accomplishes much the same result as that attained by the courts
in the procedure outlined in the previous paragraph.
When test periods, higher rates and guarantees have failed,
courts and commissions still attempt to safeguard the interests of
the patrons by ordering that the utility be offered for sale as a
going concern, to some individual or group of individuals who will
continue to operate the plant.73  If within a fixed period' 4 no
purchaser who will promise to operate the plant has appeared, the
courts still are usually willing to give the public an opportunity
to buy the utility, either through a citizens' organization or
through the local governmental authorities.75 Not until it appears
that it is improbable that the utility can be sold as a going con-
cern will the courts or commissions decree the dismantling of the
plant and the sale of the equipment as junk, Some courts have
been more lenient than others in these matters, and a few have
said that the plant is to be sold in that manner which will bring
the largest return to the creditors.70 Occasionally a court seems
70 Central Bank and Trust Corp. v. Cleveland, supra note 19; Re Boise
Valley Traction Co. (1920 F) Pub. Util. Rep. (Idaho) 962; Re St. Croix
Gaslight Co., supra note 40; See also NOTES (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 716.
71 Re St. Croix Gaslight Co., supra note 40.
72Re Boise Valley Traction Co., supra note 70; Re St. Croix Gaslight
Co., supra note 40; Re Red River Mfg. Co., supra note 47.
73 In the following cases the courts or commissions ordered thq plant to
be sold as a going concern: New York Trust Co. v. Portsmouth & Exetcr
Street Ry. (1911, C. C. D. N. H.) 192 Fed. 728; Potter Matlock Trust Co.
v. Warren Co., supra note 10; Gress v. Village of Ft. Loramie (1919) 100
Ohio St. 35, 125 N. E. 112; Re Van Auken Public Utility Plant (1925 A)
Pub. Util. Rep. (N. H.) 460. Re Red River Mfg. Co., supra note 47;
Re Boise Valley Traction Co., supra note 70. In COMMENTS (1922) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75, a note writer says, "While an unprofitable utility
may be permitted to cease its operations, yet the public interest still con-
tinues in it to the extent that the company shall not be allowed to stand
in the way of another company seeking to render such service."
74 See cases supra note 73.
75 See particularly the opinion in Gasser v. Garden Bay Ry. (1919) 205
Mich. 5, 171 N. W. 791. Also Re Richfield Public Service Co. (1922 A) Pub.
Util. Rep. (Idaho) 100. See the suggestion to this effect in Re Red River
Mfg. Co., supra note 47.
76In New York Trust Co. v. Buffalo & Lake Eric T. Co., supra note 33,
the court withheld an order to dismantle the road because there was some
conflict of opinion as to whether the road would bring more as a going
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to lose sight of the fact that the public is interested in the dispo-
sition of a public utility plant, a recent Illinois case affording an
excellent example.77 In this case the court decreed the sale of a
bankrupt road in such parcels that it was virtually impossible
for the road to be continued in operation. The case is opposed
to the prevailing practice among state and federal courts, which
is to decree the sale in foreclosure proceedings of a railroad so
that the system may be continued in operation as a system, or
else to sell it in parcels capable of being operated separately
wherever that is possible.5
The public is given a reasonably adequate time in which to
adjust itself to the new situation; and the utility is quite generally
required to give notice to the public that the service is to be dis-
continued.70 The length of such notice depends upon the circum-
concern or as junk. See also Gilchrist v. Waycross St. & Sub. Ry., G,1pra
note 69.
77 Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. r. Chicago P. & St. L. Ry. ct at.
(Brundage, Atty. Gen., 14tervenor) (1924) 314 Ill. 96, 145 N. E. 290. See
the adverse comment on this case in (1925) 34 YALE LAw JOr,,,l, ,L, 561.
There was a dissenting opinion in the case. The court explained its
attitude when it said, "There was no issue in which the state was con-
cerned." The suggestion which was made by the court that the state could
sue later if the buyers did not operate the road must not be tahen seriously,
because it was evident that this would be a practical impossibility.
78 That this is the rule observed, see Low v. Blackford (1SS, C. C. A.
4th) 87 Fed. 392; Peorim & Springfield R. R. ev. Thompson (1882) 103 Ill.
187, where it was said, "In view of the public character of the road, it will
not be questioned that the public generally have a direct interest in keep-
ing it continuously open . . . to meet all the legitimate wants of the
public." The court further payed its respects to the sort of action taken by
the Illinois court in the case cited in the text by saying, "Moreover, it is
difficult for us to believe that the wrecking of the property of a railroad
company, and selling it out by piecemeal, would in any case be for the
best interests of the public or those having an interest in its assets." See
also Dayton, Xenia & BeIpre R. R. v. Lczton (1870) 20 Ohio St. 401. In
.Metropolitan Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, & E. I. Ry. (1918, C. C. A. 7th)
253 Fed. 868, the road was sold in parcels, but each parcel could be operate l
as a complete road in itself.
TO The following cases illustrate the requirement of notice, Ncto York
Trast Co. v. Buffalo etc. Ry., supra note 76 (3 months); Re Mass. N. E. St.
Ry. (1924 A) Pub. Util. Rep. (N. H.) 700 (30 days); Re Richfield Public
Service Co., supra note 75 (3 months); Re Van Aukot Public Utility Plant,
supra, note 73 (30 days); Re Mokeluimw Rivcr Power & Water Co.
(1924 E) Pub. Util. Rep. (Calif.) 557 (reasonable time to let citizens
make other arrangements). In Southern Bcll Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad
Cwnn. of S. C. (1922, E. D. S. C.) 280 Fed. 901, at 9006, the court caid
that a public utility corporation exercising its right to cease carrying
on business because of financial loss, " . . . might be restrained from
doing so for such a reasonable time as would permit the state to meet
the situation and endeavor to provide for the service of the public." For
an Ohio statute requiring four weelm' published notice see Village of St.
Clairsville v. Public Util. Comm. (1921) 102 Ohio St. 574, 132 N. E. 151.
See Va. Rev. Sts., 1923, see. 4379. See Anmonymona case, (1623, K. B.)
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stances of each case; and it has been held that a utility furnishing
a seasonal service, such as heat, may not discontinue service
even though losing money, upon such a short notice that the com-
munity would be left without adequate heating service and would
be unable to provide themselves with one before cold weather80
Sometimes public utility corporations have attempted to escape
the burdens imposed upon them by effecting a dissolution of the
corporation. In many states there is no special statutory provi-
sion for the dissolution of public utility corporations; and the
question has been raised whether the statutory provisions which
govern the dissolution of private corporations generally are applic-
able. Courts have differed in their interpretation of such phrases
as "every corporation" or "any corporation". The Virginia court
decided in the case of Jeffi'ies v. Commonwealth"' that a public
utility corporation might dissolve itself in the manner provided
for by a general provision in a statute to the effect that "Every
corporation of this state shall have power . . . to wind up
and dissolve itself." The Corporation Commission was denied
the power to refuse the consent of the state in such dissolution
proceedings, and the state constitution was construed to have
given such consent beyond legislative recall . 2  In Arkansas an
almost identical statutory provision as that under review in the
Virginia case was construed not to be applicable to public service
corporations.1
3
Where there is no special statutory provision for the dissolution
of public service corporations, and the corporation dissolves itself
in accordance with the general provision on the dissolution of
corporations, without the consent of the state, it has been held
that a minority stockholder may not object to dissolution on the
ground that the consent of the state has not been given84 It has
Goodbolt, 345 reprinted in Burdick, Cases on the Law of Public Service
(1916) 445.
80 Re Winona Electric Light & Water Co. (1920 F.) Pub. Util. Rep..
(Ind.) 968.
81 (1917) 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.
82 Sec. 154 of the Virginia Constitution of 1902 provides, "Provision shall
be made, by general law, for the voluntary surrender of its charter by any
corporation, and for the forfeiture thereof for non-user or mis-user." In
sec. 3810 of Gen. Sts. of Va., 1923, a published notice for each of four weeks
by a public service corporation is required prior to proceedings of dis-
solution; and it seems that the commission is empowered to deny such dis-
solution if after an investigation it sees fit to do so. Whether the Virginia
court will declare this portion of the section contrary to the state constitu-
tional provision quoted above is problematical, although in the Jeffries case
the court did stress the constitutional provision. See note to sec. 3810, in
which the unsatisfactory state of the law under this decision and the section
enacted to remedy it is discussed at some length by the annotator.
83 Freeo Valley Railroad Co. v. Hodges (1912) 105 Ark. 314, 151 S. W.
281.
841foore v. Lewisburg & R. E. By. (1917) 80 W. Va. 653, 93 S. E. 762.
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also been decided that a charter may not be surrendered by the
president and directors of a public service corporation, but that
appropriate action must be taken by a majority of the stock-
holders 5
In Massachusetts a statute forbade gas companies to transfer
their franchises, lease their works, etc. without legislative con-
sent. An attempt was made by one utility corporation, through
the method of reorganization, to effect without legislative consent
what the court believed to be substantially such a transfer as
the statute forbade. In the course of its opinion the court said,'G
. . . it cannot surrender its franchises nor disable itself from
the performance of its public functions without the consent of
the legislature."
While this might seem at first glance to be a decision of somewhat
doubtful soundness in the face of some recent federal decisions
noted previously, still it may perhaps be sustained upon the gen-
eral power which legislatures have over matters of incorporation,
transfer of franchises, and similar matters falling under the
police power of the state.
A corporation which was not originally organized for the pur-
pose of engaging in public service, but which was declared to be
within the jurisdiction of the public service commission of a
state because the corporation in question owned a controlling
block of stock in a public utility corporation, was allowed to
withdraw from commission jurisdiction by transferring this stock
to private individuals? 7 The dissolution of this relationship was
held sufficient to restore the corporation to the status of an ordi-
nary private corporation. The court seemed to stress the fact
in this case that the holding corporation did not serve the public
directly in any way.
No case has been found in which the owner of the utility was
seeking to abandon the service and dismantle the plant where
he was earning what the courts would call a fair return but which
to him was not satisfactory. Whether an investor in a public
This court also construed the general corporation provision governing dis-
solution to apply to public service corporations and is therefore in accorJ
with the Jeffries case on this point.
85 Town of Gassaway v. Gassaway Gas Co. (1914) 75 W. Va. 60, 83 S. E.
189.
80 Attorney Gen. v. Haverhill Gaslight Co. (1913) 215 Dlass. 394, 400,
101 N. E. 1061, 1064. See also Cunmbcrlan c Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Erawsville
(1903, C. C. D. Ind.) 127 Fed. 187, at 191, vhere the court said in the
course of its opinion, "A quasi-public corporation cannot disable it'elf for
the performance of its functions by the sale and transfer of an its property
without legislative authority." The court found no statutory authoriza-
tion for the transfer in this case.
87 Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio (1924) 110
Ohio St. 246, 143 N. E. 700.
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utility will be compelled to keep his money there when he wishes
to take it out and invest it in some more profitable business is a
problem which the courts may be called upon to answer in the
not distant future. Lest such a suggestion be thought too aca-
demic, attention is called to a case where the owners of the
utility felt that they would profit by selling the plant as junk,
due to the prevailing high price which would be paid for some
of the materials which would be disposed of in that wayA8
An attempt has been made to state as accurately as the writer
has been able the rules thus far laid down by the courts in
handling withdrawal cases. Many problems have been suggested
which will remain to be answered in the future. The type of
answer to be given may be different from that which might be
given if the problem were to be settled today, because of the
changing economic and social ideas which are important factorm
in cases like those considered in this paper. One can not but
wonder, however, what the Interstate Commerce Commission
would do if one of the transcontinental carriers should come to
it seeking permission to discontinue its entire service, all saving
possibility of rates and regional pools having failed to make the
road pay. The question seems naturally to present itself at
the conclusion of a study of the cases on withdrawal whether
regulation by the government of privately owned utilities of such
magnitude is only transitory, and the end either unrestricted
private control or government ownership.
88 Moore v. Lewisburg & R. E. Ry., supra note 84.
